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This vast, heavily detailed and deeply researched book presents an account
of the diplomatic history of the ‘West New Guinea problem’ and thus of the
political fate of the people and territory of western New Guinea. In just over
800 pages, Professor Drooglever describes the painful and always vexed history
of the incorporation of the peoples of the western segment of the island of
New Guinea (an ‘originally very primitive society’, 14) into the modern world.
It is a tragic, bitter and frustrating story, one of marginality, powerlessness,
and the victory of primordial moral certainty (however misplaced) and
cynicism over weakly-grounded good intentions.
Basing himself upon an unrivalled knowledge of the diplomatic sources,
and employing a great talent for synthesis and a drily witty and compact style,
Drooglever traces the history of the peoples of Papua in fourteen chapters. He
tells the story of the cultural distance of most of Papua’s people from the more
western peoples of the Indonesian archipelago, the slow and incomplete efforts
of Dutch colonialism to lay claim to and then begin to govern the western part
of the island (for strategic, not economic, advantage), the growing sense
amongst the Dutch (and some Papuans as well) that New Guinea was not
quite like the rest of their Netherlands Indies and therefore needed to be
treated differently, the multi-purposed, gradually arrived at, but ultimately
disastrous decision not to hand over the territory to the newly-created
Republic of the United States of Indonesia in 1949, the consequently accelera-
ting tensions between Indonesia and the Netherlands when the former realised
that New Guinea would not easily and naturally fall into its grasp and when
the Dutch, for their part, began a new colonial project in the region, the bitter,
troubling negotiations, partly a product of gathering Dutch doubts about its
own capacity and the measure of international support it might receive, which
finally placed the territory first under UN, then Indonesian, administration in
1962-1963, and the fateful ‘Act of Free Choice’ which finally delivered the
territory unconditionally but by no means unreservedly to Indonesia.
There is much to praise in this huge and complex work. Most obviously,
there is the breadth of research and the meticulous scholarship focussed on
archival collections in three countries, a number of interviews, and a broad list
of ancillary secondary works. There are, further, the skills of synthesis and
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organisation which bring together this multi-faceted work into a solid,
readable, stylish unity. There is, as well, a certain dispassionateness in the
prose, an almost unfashionable sense that there is an objective truth to be
uncovered, and that the way to uncover it is through a diligent, detached and
disinterested reading of the paper record of government actions. Whatever one
may think of this mode of analysis, it does leave the reader with the sense that
this book is and will remain the definitive work on this subject; no one else
will have the patience, skill, deftness and opportunity to perform anything like
this piece on investigation again. It sheds new light and new detail on aspects
of the story — for example, the complex meshing of factors which gave birth
to the Netherlands’ New Guinea policy in the immediate post-war period —
and does so with an enormous comprehensiveness and totalising quality. There
can be no doubt this work will serve as essential primary reading for anyone
seriously interested in this subject in the future. Which, of course, raises the
question as to why it was published in the Dutch language, something which,
notwithstanding the many virtues of that language, must certainly hinder the
book’s capacity to be read, absorbed and learned from in broader international
circles, and notably in Indonesia itself.
Drooglever’s account can be read on many levels and in many ways. At
one level it is the story of a failed imperial project: the retreat of the
Netherlands from the status of imposing imperial power to that of a relatively
insignificant little country of western Europe, and the effects that change in
status had both upon its leaders and those upon whom they wished to exercise
distant power. At another level still, it may be read as a sad parable of
powerlessness and marginality, a powerlessness that exhibited itself in profound
ways at different times — the powerlessness of the Indonesians, at least those
attached to the Republic, both to halt the Dutch federal project and, later, to
prevent the Dutch retaining control of New Guinea after the transfer of
sovereignty in 1949; the powerlessness of the Dutch, once sovereignty had
been transferred, and once the combination of Cold War realism and Third
World revulsion at imperialism combined to render their efforts to make
something better of New Guinea completely hopeless. Most of all, this is a
story of the powerlessness of Papuans themselves: colonised, undeveloped,
fought over, bartered with, encouraged, betrayed, and then colonised again.
That Papuans are so passive, so victimised and, indeed, that they play so
insignificant a part in the overall narrative of the book is instructive and
sobering indeed. Third, the book might be read as an unflattering account of
diplomatic process: the effusive claims and grandiloquence, the moral grand-
standings, the game of bluff and counterbluff (always with people’s lives and
futures hanging in the balance), of miscalculation, of claims to power where
there was no power, of ruthless arrogance, the inconsistencies and illogicalities
of policy from time to time, and always the overhanging sense that the
problem, made in the first instance by the Dutch, would never be solved by
the Dutch.
In reviewing this complex issue over the longer period of twentieth century
history, one is tempted to think against the grain and to wonder whether this
terrible tale really had to play itself out in this way. In that sense, though on a
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much smaller scale, there is a kind of essential insolubility to the problem here
that inevitably brings the Middle East to mind. But might anything have been
done to make things different, and better? Right from the beginning, things
seemed to have been stacked against the Papuans. Apart from the fact that they
had the misfortune to be colonised at all, they were colonised by a small and
uninfluential European power whose capacity to carve out an Indies empire
was essentially a result of the strategic disposition of larger world powers at
the time. Second, the Dutch, busy with other parts of the Indies, and by the
1930s economically crippled by the Depression, never attempted to make
much of this part of the Indies. New Guinea’s major fame — or rather
notoriety — came from the fact that it housed the notorious Digul internment
camp for Indonesian political dissidents. Third, after 1942, the Dutch,
completely overwhelmed by the Japanese, then caught sleeping by the ferocity
and reach of the nascent independence movement under Sukarno, were always
scrambling to make up time and power in the archipelago, and that weakness
in turn prompted them to attempt to demonstrate a capacity they no longer
really enjoyed. The result was the crucial, foolish and catastrophic decision,
slowly and almost inadvertently come to, to attempt to hold on to New
Guinea in the context of the general decolonisation of Indonesia. That, in
retrospect was the crucial moment.
Thereafter, though the Dutch triumphed at the time, it was the most empty
and, for the people of Papua, the most damaging of victories. Thereafter, the
story is one of foolish optimism and inevitable decline for Dutch interests in
the face of world opinion which increasingly turned sour, and a determined
Indonesian offensive to claim what it considered its own as of right. Had the
Dutch handed over the territory with the rest of Indonesia in 1949, the
problem would never have arisen (though the fate of Papuans themselves
might not necessarily have been any better). On their good intentions, to
provide an eventual and meaningful right of self-determination to the Papuan
peoples, whatever their confused moral and political bases, was a policy set in
train which could never succeed in the reigning context and which inevitably
brought sorrow and death to many.
At a fundamental level, the problem of Dutch efforts to preserve New
Guinea as its own, and eventually to allow it to pass to its own form of
freedom, was based on an almost complete failure to understand the nature
and tenacity of Indonesian nationalism. That central failure is captured in this
book, but in ways, I suspect, that the author did not intend. Drooglever’s
noble efforts to deliver the facts on the New Guinea problem fail for precisely
the same reason numerous Dutch governments did: an inability to appreciate
the depth and frustrating constancy of post-war Indonesian nationalism. That
is this book’s greatest flaw.
Drooglever’s project, as he notes in his foreword, is ‘to write a study of the
relations between the Netherlands and New Guinea, the conflict with
Indonesia which flowed from that, and the series of events in relation to the
Act of Free Choice.’ (12) He notes the fact that, notwithstanding the best
efforts of Dutch authorities, the Indonesian government was unwilling to
cooperate in the study. It is partly because of this difficulty that the archival
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sources are essentially those of countries which were generally as unsympa-
thetic to the nature and power of Indonesian nationalism as the Dutch
themselves. This source basis, together with the original intention with which
the work was conceptualised, immediately means that the history we read is
written, as it were, over the shoulder of numerous Dutch officials and
diplomats. Equally, it means that the Indonesian side of the story is presented
in essentially ahistorical and sometimes puzzling terms which inevitably cast
the Indonesian actors as stubborn and unyielding belligerents who have no
sense of the noble virtues of self-determination and fairness.
It would be foolish not to acknowledge the double-dealing, cynicism and
outright intolerance and cruelty which characterised much of the Indonesian
diplomatic, military and political effort to claim New Guinea as an integral
part of Indonesia. At the same time, however, it does not assist the untutored
to appreciate the utter complexity of the situation if the key dimension of the
Indonesian nationalist impulse is left unexplained, or cast in terms designed to
deny it any kind of moral privilege.
A prominent feature of early post-war Dutch understandings of the
Republican upsurge, notably in Java and Sumatra, was that the Republican
leadership, notably Sukarno himself, was not truly representative of a broader
social movement to achieve freedom. While it was certainly true that the
Republican movement was most strongly anchored in Java and Sumatra, and
that it found — for reasons to do with Dutch colonial policy, Japanese
wartime administrative decisions and the area’s early liberation — less fertile
ground in parts of eastern Indonesia, Dutch efforts to capitalise on that relative
weakness in the form of a federal movement proved a failure when the second
police action finally provoked the United Nations — that is, the Americans —
to intercede on the part of the Republic. The attitude of the federal states was,
if anything, even more aggressively nationalist than that of the Republic in the
lead up to and in the course of the Round Table negotiations of 1949.
Thereafter, the federal experiment — viewed as a remnant of recalcitrant
colonialism by the Republic — quickly collapsed, something that itself
stimulated the desire to complete the project of achieving freedom for the
whole territory of the Republic of the August 1945 proclamation.
Drooglever goes on to document the detail of the decline in Indonesian-
Dutch relations which followed the failure of the Dutch to do what the
Indonesians had expected — hand over New Guinea. In his discussion, he pits
a relentless and cajoling Indonesia against a Netherlands whose good inten-
tions for what remained of its Indies empire inspire it to develop, materially,
spiritually and politically, a new sense of identity. This is, of course, an uneven
moral contest, even if in the end the pressure of world opinion (and especially
the will of a new American administration determined not to upset the
Indonesians too much is an increasingly dangerous Southeast Asia) sees the
defeat of the morally upright. Finally overwhelmed, the powerless Netherlands
is forced to hand over New Guinea to the United Nations, and then to an
Indonesian administration which, we are not surprised to find, employs
skulduggery, brutality, and the strategic invocation of alleged Indonesian
cultural values to arrange an act of free choice which it can never lose.
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Relieved that the problem is over, the United Nations and its members
acquiesce in the charade.
There is, of course, a great deal of truth in the story Drooglever presents.
And yet, partly for reasons to do with his aims, partly, perhaps, because of his
lack of access to Indonesian official sources, but mainly, I think, because of the
moral frame in which the book is presented, it is not a wholly accurate and
thus misleading account because of its failure adequately to come to grips with
the Indonesian drive for national integrity. It is something of a puzzle to those
who know little of Indonesian nationalism that Indonesia was prepared to
invest so much effort, money, and its good name as well as the blood of its
sons to secure a remote part of the former Netherlands East Indies. As
Drooglever himself points out, some prominent nationalist leaders, notably
Hatta, thought little of marginal New Guinea and were not especially troubled
at the prospect of its ‘loss’. Even earlier, Syahrir, travelling through eastern
Indonesia on his way to exile in Digul early in 1935, was struck by feelings of
distance and isolation. In the fashion of a tourist in a new land, he remarked
‘how beautiful this eastern part of our country is.’2 Of eastern Indonesia there
was, indeed, a certain disdain; ‘from a social point of view this part of
Indonesia has almost no meaning.’3 And yet for most Indonesians this was —
and had always been — an integral part their country, even if they knew
nothing of it and even if many of them were wont to treat its indigenous
inhabitants with patronising contempt. The social will which had been
manifested in the August 1945 proclamation was matter of the exercise of
leaders acting in the name of the people and thus a matter of right, the
reclamation, by force if necessary, of a history and an identity previously lost
to European colonialism. It was not something subject to plebiscites or the
plaything of locally popular interests, any more than, say, an Australian federal
government would countenance the loss of one of its constituent states
through a local exercise in the right of self-determination.
Put in this way, it is perhaps easier to understand the depth of Indonesian
wrath at the fact that its relative impotence in the 1949 negotiations had
resulted in the excision of an integral part of its being. While it is certainly
true that this sense of nationalist humiliation was ruthlessly and shamelessly
employed, especially after 1954, by Sukarno and other actors in domestic
Indonesian politics (notably the army) for their own political advantage, there
can be no doubting the fact the very presence of a Dutch occupied New
Guinea was a continuing slight to a great many Indonesians, something which
gave the political ploys of Sukarno and others their pungency and immediacy.
Seen from this vantage point, the unswerving, and gradually heightening
demands of the Republic for the restoration of its wholeness takes on a new
light, and the efforts of the Dutch to nurture and develop a Papuan elite begin
to look less like the well-intentioned desire for the realisation of self-
determinations and rather more like the irresponsible sowing of seeds of
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discord — seeds which were to come to fruition in good time — within the
Indonesian nation. This dimension of the analysis is almost wholly lacking in
Drooglever’s analysis, and represents a crippling deficiency in what is
otherwise a superbly crafted piece of work.
How might the deficiency have been made good? Within Drooglever’s
given moral frame of reference, such would be impossible, since the whole
tenor of the book is to represent the fact that good intentions for the sake of a
small and weak people is noble, even if it is sometimes misconceived and
unthinking, and even if it ultimately results in failure. But Drooglever’s failure
to attempt to understand the underlying dynamic of the Indonesian nationalist
impulse and the consequent tenacity of its eventually victorious diplomacy,
presents an unnervingly one-sided account of a complex and many-sided
problem. Given that he is so clearly a scholar who seeks to write without
preconceptions and who seeks to achieve ‘a reasonable measure of objectivity’
(15), one wonders whether a more thorough exposure to Indonesians and
Indonesia-centric sources (I counted just nine Indonesian-language books in
the bibliography, and no reference at all to any Indonesian newspapers) might
have caused him to reframe that moral frame, and perhaps to cast what is
currently flagged as the humane and well-intended hopes of the Netherlands as
silly, misconceived, conceited policy, which itself resulted, in the given context,
in unmeasured suffering and a trauma which has not yet run its course.
In an important sense, Drooglever’s book adds nothing of great significance
to what is now a well-known tale: of Dutch conniving to deprive the
Indonesian Republic of the final victory it sought and thought it had achieved,
of persistent and unconscionable Indonesian efforts to reverse their 1949 loss,
of a Dutch moral crusade which outreached its capacity to achieve its end in
the context of a rapidly changing international political and moral order, and
of subsequent Indonesian scheming, connivance, and downright terror in the
name of the furtherance of its own moral claim. That much we knew already.
Drooglever’s weighty tome adds depth, personality, nuance and scholarly detail
to the outlines of that story, and for this we are much in his debt. Would that
the missing dimension of his work had been included. But that might have
prevented him reaching the smoothly moral conclusions he eventually does,
that the Dutch, despite their many failings and stubbornness, really had their
heart in the right place, and that their ultimate failure was a function of their
essential weakness in a wider world. That conclusion, I fear, lets Dutch policy
off too lightly. In ignoring and thus maligning the strength and the unforgiving
nature of the post-war Indonesian nationalist project, Drooglever commits the
same fault as did those Dutch policy makers whose efforts to control change
in the 1940s and 1950s whilst ignoring or attempting to deflect that national
will of the Indonesians, led in the end to the tragically unresolved ‘problem’ of
New Guinea.
Bob Elson (1947) is Professor of Southeast Asian History, School of History, Philosophy,
Religion, and Classics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australië.
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Summary
Bob Elson, Marginality, morality, and the nationalist impulse: Papua, the
Netherlands and Indonesia: a review article
Drooglever’s large and detailed analysis of the course of ‘West New Guinea
problem’ demonstrates a mastery of sources and of the skills of synthesis, and
will certainly become the definitive work on the subject. The book may be
read at many levels, as a story of Dutch imperial decline and diplomatic failure,
of Indonesian powerlessness, and of Papuan victimhood, as the Dutch refused
to concede New Guinea, attempted to develop an indigenous Papuan political
capacity, and were finally overwhelmed by a combination of Indonesian
determination and the changing circumstances of international politics. The
book’s greatest weakness, just like the post-war Dutch policy which is its
subject, is its failure to appreciate the strength, depth and moral force of
Indonesian nationalism, something reflected not only in the one-sided moral
tone of the book, but also in its failure to analyse Indonesian sources and
attitudes with sufficient seriousness.
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‘Geschiedenis is nu eenmaal altijd politiek.’ De
studie-Drooglever als symptoom van de moei-
zame omgang van Nederland met het koloniaal
verleden en de complexe relatie met Indonesië
HANS MEIJER
Politieke ophef
Het komt niet vaak voor dat een historische studie in Nederland
voorpaginanieuws is, laat staan politieke ophef teweeg brengt. Het op
regeringsverzoek door het NIOD geschreven Srebrenica-rapport dat leidde tot
de val van het kabinet-Kok-II in april 2002 was in die zin een uitzonderlijk
geval. Maar ook een ander, door een lid van datzelfde kabinet-Kok-II
ingewilligd parlementair verzoek om geschiedkundig onderzoek te laten doen,
bracht een Nederlandse regering (het kabinet-Balkenende-II (mei 2003-juli
2006)) in de problemen, zij het dat dit keer (buitenlandse) politieke averij —
met enige moeite — kon worden afgewend.
Wat was het geval? Halverwege november 2005 werden onder grote
mediabelangstelling en in aanwezigheid van tal van binnenlandse en buiten-
landse mensenrechtenorganisaties de resultaten gepresenteerd van het onder-
zoek van de bij het Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis (ING) werkzame
historicus P. J. Drooglever naar de finale afwikkeling van de zogeheten
kwestie-Nieuw-Guinea. Daarbij ging de aandacht speciaal uit naar de verwik-
kelingen rondom de zogeheten ‘Daad van vrije keuze’ in de zomer van 1969,
waarbij Nieuw-Guinea middels een door Jakarta georganiseerde volksraadple-
ging definitief werd ingelijfd bij Indonesië. Het was een publiek geheim dat dit
op een oneerlijke manier was geschied. Ook op het Binnenhof keek men met
een zekere gespannenheid naar Drooglevers bevindingen. Immers, het was
bekend dat het kabinet er mee in zijn maag zat vanwege de te verwachten
ongemakkelijke eindbevindingen die de traditioneel gevoelige bilaterale betrek-
kingen tussen Nederland en Indonesië leken te zullen gaan compliceren.
Sterker nog: dat sinds de aanvang van het onderzoek al deden. Bevreesd als het
kabinet was om ook maar op enigerlei wijze naar buiten — zowel naar de
Papoea’s toe, maar bovenal richting Jakarta — de indruk te wekken dat het,
ondanks herhaalde ontkenningen, aan de studie enige politieke betekenis
hechtte, laat staan er gevolgtrekkingen aan zou verbinden, liet minister van
Buitenlandse Zaken B. R. Bot (december 2003-februari 2007) verstek gaan op
de presentatiebijeenkomst. Hij zag er van af Drooglevers monografie Een daad
van vrije keuze. De Papoea’s van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van
het zelfbeschikkingsrecht overreikt te krijgen door de auteur. Met zijn
afwezigheid getuigde Bot niet alleen van weinig respect en waardering voor de
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